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Abstract 
 
A theoretical perspective that may help explain conflict between diverse groups is the 
ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Ingroup projection is an 
ethnocentric representation of a superordinate group that renders the ingroup relatively more 
prototypical (thus more normative, positive and deserving) than an outgroup believes is the 
case. Ingroup projection can lead to ingroup bias and prejudice against outgroups by 
portraying them as deviant. We review theory and research on the ingroup projection model, 
demonstrating its applicability to a wide range of intergroup contexts. We specifically discuss 
research on the multi-faceted cognitive, motivational, strategic and ideological underpinnings 
of ingroup projection, as well as threats resulting from beliefs that outgroups engages in such 
projection. We then focus on representational properties of superordinate identities that might 
limit ingroup projection, such as complexity or diversity, which however in themselves can 
become matters of contention between the involved groups. We argue that a precondition for 
positive intergroup relations is not only one of consensus between groups about their relative 
prototypicalities, which would foster harmony, but also acceptance of more equal 
prototypicality, which implies social change. Despite limitations and obstacles, superordinate 
identity complexity or diversity may hold the key for obtaining this goal.    
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As often we could begin such a chapter in a volume on intergroup conflict with a dire 
description of the state of human society and the continuing menace of social discrimination, 
prejudice, injustice, and ethnic violence. However, a children’s book by the Austrian writer 
Edith Schreiber-Wicke (1990), whose title may be translated as “When the crows were still 
colourful”, provides a fable that is more fun, yet insightful. It describes the story of the crows 
when they still came in all sorts of colours and patterns – orange with blue stripes, green with 
yellow spots, and so on – until one day a snowman asked the fateful (and probably spiteful) 
question of what a real, true crow looked like. Now the yellow-with-blue-spotted crows 
declared yellow with blue spots was the true colour of crows, but the lilac crows argued the 
ur-crow was lilac-coloured, and all the other crows also claimed their colours were the real 
ones. There was arguing and quarrelling; the crows began to fly with like-coloured others 
only. The fighting ended only when one day a black rain turned all animals black. 
Afterwards, only the crows stayed black and no longer had a reason to argue. The moral of 
the story? Obviously: ingroup projection is a challenge of diversity! And if we do not want to 
buy social harmony with dull sameness, we had better think of a more creative way to 
appreciate and enjoy differences. 
Ingroup projection is the perception or claim that one’s own group is more 
prototypical for a higher-order superordinate identity, hence more normative and positive, 
than a relevant comparison outgroup is; or more prototypical at least than the outgroup thinks 
the ingroup is. In the present chapter we will briefly outline the ingroup projection model 
(IPM; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007), discuss its 
key concepts, relevant recent findings, and essentially argue for two ways in which we need 
to construe our superordinate identities in order to reduce tension between diverse and 
divergent groups included in them: we need to advance consensus about the superordinate 
identity in question, and about the complexity of its representation. 
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Outline of the Ingroup Projection Model 
Ingroup projection may be understood as a contemporary version and specification of 
an early concept in psychology and sociology: ethnocentrism (Gumplowicz, 1879; Sumner, 
1906). Ethnocentrism describes a tendency of members to use their own group, its values and 
norms, as a judgmental reference standard for their social world, including other groups. 
Judging others by one’s own group’s standards is likely to lead to a sense of superiority of 
one’s own group and the devaluation of others. However, whereas in ethnocentrism the 
imposition of one’s own standards is somehow direct from one group to others (see Hegarty 
& Chryssochoou, 2005), in the concept of ingroup projection the process is mediated via the 
generalization of such standards to a higher-order identity in which certain other groups are 
included too; and qua their inclusion in the higher-order, superordinate identity these 
standards are seen as valid and applicable to those other groups. As a consequence, in 
contrast to ethnocentrism as an almost natural unfettered tendency, the process in ingroup 
projection is constrained by the social context and how individuals represent it. 
The notion of ingroup projection is basically a corollary of self-categorization theory 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). This theory assumes that individuals use 
social categories to structure and give meaning to their social world, including their selves. 
They classify themselves as members of one category in contrast to others; more specifically, 
depending on the social context, as members of categories at various levels of inclusiveness: 
at an individual level (or even sub-individual level, such as the real vs. ideal self), a group 
level (with groups obviously also differing in their breadth and inclusiveness), up to the 
human level (or even supra-human level, such as living beings). These self-categorizations 
form the basis of an individual’s contextually defined self-concept; self-categorization as a 
member of a group is the cognitive component of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  
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The evaluative connotations of one’s social identity derive from comparisons with 
relevant outgroups (although they may also form through intragroup interactions alone; 
Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). Self-categorization theory assumes that comparisons 
between ingroup and outgroup imply that both are included in a superordinate, more inclusive 
category; only their shared inclusion makes two groups comparable (Turner et al., 1987). 
Their more abstract similarity at a superordinate level (e.g., humans have skin with 
pigmentation) allows their comparison at a group level (e.g., the ingroup’s skin tone is lighter 
than the outgroup’s). Moreover, the superordinate category may be represented in form of a 
contextually defined prototype (see Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998), which constitutes the 
normative and positively valued position on the comparison dimension (e.g., the prototypical 
human skin tone is light olive). The groups are evaluated in terms of their relative closeness 
to that prototypical position; their relative prototypicality. The more prototypical a group is 
relative to a relevant comparison group, the more positively valued it is, and the higher in 
status and more deserving it is judged (see Wenzel, 2004).  
When individuals self-categorize as members of an ingroup, they depersonalise and 
adopt their group’s goal and values (Turner et al., 1987). Their commitment to their ingroup’s 
goals and values means they are motivated, and may experience ingroup pressures, to 
advance their group’s goals; its positive distinctiveness, status, power or deservingness. This 
is where ingroup projection comes in, namely as the vehicle through which committed group 
members may seek to advance their group’s standing, by perceiving or portraying it as more 
prototypical for a salient and identity-relevant superordinate category, compared to a salient 
outgroup (Wenzel et al., 2007). On the flipside, to the degree that the ingroup claims to 
represent the prototype of the superordinate group (specifically, in terms that render the 
ingroup distinct from the outgroup), the comparison outgroup is perceived to be less 
prototypical, more deviant, less valued and less deserving. Thus, ingroup projection should be 
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related to ingroup favouritism (i.e., a relatively more positive evaluation and treatment of the 
ingroup). Conversely, to the extent that the outgroup is seen as deviating from the 
superordinate norm or questioning it, ingroup projection should be related to outgroup 
derogation and hostility. Hence, diversity (i.e., the presence of group differences) poses 
challenges when groups engage in projection and make their own the norm of the 
superordinate group. 
Evidence across a Range of Intergroup Contexts 
Fundamental Processes 
There is good empirical evidence for these fundamental predictions of the IPM (for an 
earlier review, see Wenzel et al., 2007). For example, as processes of ingroup projection 
should generally apply to the perspectives of both groups in a salient intergroup context, this 
would lead to a perspective-divergence between the groups about their relative 
prototypicality. Consistent with this, business administration students and psychology 
students disagreed about their relative prototypicality for students generally, with business 
administration students perceiving themselves as more prototypical than psychology students 
thought they were, and vice versa (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). Similar 
patterns were found for chopper and sports bikers, primary and high-school teachers, and 
East and West Germans (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004). Further 
evidence shows that members tend to engage in greater projection when they identify with 
both their ingroup (implying commitment to advance their group’s goals) and the 
superordinate group (implying recurrence to it is a relevant normative referent), as the model 
predicts (Ullrich, Christ, & Schlüter, 2006; Wenzel et al., 2003; Waldzus, Mummendey, 
Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). Likewise, group members claim greater prototypicality specifically 
for ingroup attributes that are distinct from those of the outgroup in the given context. When 
Britons were the salient outgroup German participants projected attributes on which Germans 
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were stereotypically different from Britons, whereas when Italians were the salient outgroup 
they claimed greater prototypicality on attributes on which they were stereotypically different 
from Italians (Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005). This is consistent with the idea that 
ingroup projection is most functional when distinctive and contextually group-defining 
features are considered prototypical.  
Similarly, there is supportive evidence that perceived relative prototypicality is related 
to negative attitudes and behavioural intentions towards the outgroup (e.g., Wenzel et al., 
2003; Waldzus et al., 2003, 2005), perceived legitimacy of higher ingroup status (Weber, 
Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002), and perceptions of entitlement (Wenzel, 2001), including 
support for policies limiting the rights and opportunities of ethnic minorities (Huynh, Devos, 
& Altman, 2015). However, consistent with the model, relative ingroup prototypicality was 
related to negative outgroup attitudes only when the superordinate identity was positively 
valenced; when it was negatively valenced the meaning of prototypicality reversed, with it 
being positively related to outgroup attitudes (Wenzel et al., 2003, Study 3). As a further 
theory-consistent qualification, the perceived relative prototypicality of the ingroup was only 
related to negative outgroup attitudes when the superordinate category was indeed inclusive 
of the outgroup. For example, Germans’ perceived relative prototypicality for West 
Europeans (a category that does not include Poland) was not related to attitudes towards the 
Polish, but relative ingroup prototypicality for Europeans, which includes the Polish, was 
(Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; see also Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, Banse, & Wigboldus, 
2011).  
A meta-analysis reported by Wenzel et al. (2007) indicated a significant relationship 
of moderate size between relative prototypicality and intergroup attitudes. Two studies by 
Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler, Luecke and Schubert (2012) found this relationship to be 
stronger for relative prototypicality measured in relation to the ideal, rather than actual, 
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superordinate category, probably because the ideal implies a more prescriptive reference 
standard.  Further, using cross-lagged regressions in a two-wave study on native Germans’ 
attitudes towards immigrants, Kessler et al. (2010) found indications for causal effects of 
relative ingroup prototypicality on intergroup emotions and attitudes; however, they also 
found signs of the reverse causality, suggesting that ingroup projection may also serve a 
justification of existing prejudices. This should not surprise: if, as assumed, motivational and 
normative pressures elicit ingroup projection based on one’s identification with one’s 
ingroup, then such motivations and norms may equally well stem from one’s ‘anti-
identification’ with, and one’s group’s negative views towards, the outgroup. Below, we 
return to the question of the different social and epistemic functions of ingroup projection.  
History, Humanity and Holiness 
Despite the identity-driven tendency to cast one’s ingroup as the more prototypical 
group for a salient superordinate group, this is conditioned by the given social, historical and 
ideological context. For example, in re-unified Germany both East and West Germans rated 
West Germans as the more prototypical subgroup (even if they disagreed about the extent to 
which this was the case), which is not surprising as it was the East German system that 
collapsed whereas the West German one prevailed and integrated East Germany – going hand 
in hand with West Germans having economic and political dominance (Waldzus et al., 2004), 
as well as constituting the numerical majority. Similarly, while both Protestants and Catholics 
agreed on Northern Ireland being a relevant superordinate category, they both also perceived 
Protestants as having greater overlap with (prototypicality for) Northern Ireland (Noor, 
Brown, Taggart, Fernandez, Coen, 2010). Protestants, while identifying more strongly with 
Northern Ireland than Catholics did, were less prepared to forgive the outgroup, the more 
strongly they identified with the superordinate group. This is contrary to research showing a 
common superordinate categorization is beneficial for intergroup forgiveness (Wohl & 
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Branscombe, 2005; see also Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Protestants might have considered 
their group as higher-status and more deserving because of their greater prototypicality, and 
therefore might have been less willing to make concessions to, and sympathize with, the 
outgroup in particular when they identified strongly with the superordinate group. Ingroup 
projection may thus be an important qualifier of the effects of common ingroup identity. 
Indeed, even the most abstract of human-social categories, widely considered the most 
sacrosanct, is not immune to these processes: humanity. Certainly, identification with 
humanity has regularly been found to be positively related with a number of prosocial 
outcomes such as the reduction of global inequality and the advancement of human rights 
(e.g., McFarland, Brown, & Webb, 2013; Reese, Proch, & Finn, 2015). However, the human 
category also seems to be a platform for ingroup projection processes, where distinct 
attributes of the ingroup in relation to a salient outgroup tend to be considered more typically 
human (Paladino & Vaes, 2009). Such a process mirrors the phenomenon of infra-
humanisation where an ingroup is perceived to be able to experience complex, uniquely 
human emotions more than a salient outgroup is (Leyens et al., 2000), which has been shown 
to underpin or express intergroup prejudices (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2004). Koval, Laham, 
Haslam, Bastian and Wheelan (2012) found that such seeming projection held more 
specifically for negatively valenced attributes, suggesting that ingroup members may 
humanize their weaknesses to protect their group identity. Further evidence has supported the 
view that such ingroup projection processes may limit, or even pervert, the positive benefits 
commonly expected from a human identity. Reese, Berthold and Steffens (2012) found that 
members of an economically developed country rated developed countries (the ingroup) as 
more prototypical for all humans than developing countries. There was furthermore evidence 
that ingroup prototypicality was positively related to perceived legitimacy of global 
inequality and, mediated by this, negatively related to behavioural intentions to advance the 
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situation for developing countries and the idea of global equality. Reese, Berthold, and 
Steffens (2015) replicated these findings with regard to actual donation behaviour: Claiming 
to be more human can make one less humane. 
Finally, processes of ingroup projection do not stop at religion either (or, perhaps at 
religion least of all!). Lie and Verkuyten (2012) referred to Islam as superordinate category 
and surveyed Turkish-Dutch Sunni Muslims and their feelings towards Alevi and Shiite 
Muslims. The authors found that Sunnis regarded their ingroup as more prototypical for Islam 
than Alevis and Shiites; perceived relative prototypicality was in turn negatively related to 
intergroup feelings towards these groups measured on a feeling thermometer.  
 There is thus good evidence for the basic principles of the ingroup projection model 
across a range of intergroup contexts; from the mundane to the politically charged, from the 
quintessentially human to the holy.  
Advances in our Understanding of Ingroup Projection 
The label ingroup projection should be understood as a metaphor. It is not meant as an 
expression of hidden drives and suppressed desires in a psychodynamic sense; and it does not 
privilege an understanding of the process as motivated and unconscious, rather than cognitive 
and heuristic, or strategic and deliberate; it may be all of the above. Likewise, the process can 
be literally projective/inductive in that the representation of the higher-order group is infused 
by that of the lower-level ingroup, but it can also be introjective/deductive where the ingroup 
representation is assimilated to that of the superordinate category (e.g., classical infra-
humanization where the ingroup is described in terms of quintessentially human emotions; 
Paladino & Vaes, 2009). Ingroup projection basically only describes the observation that 
people indicate their ingroup to be relatively more prototypical for a common superordinate 
category than other observers, such as members of a relevant outgroup, indicate it to be 
(Wenzel et al., 2007; see Figure 1). 
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Implicit Ingroup Projection 
Recent research, however, has made some considerable advances in our understanding 
of the processes. First, ingroup projection can indeed be observed at a subliminal level and 
can occur spontaneously without cognitive control. Bianchi, Mummendey, Steffens, and 
Yzerbyt (2010) used a semantic priming technique and found that the superordinate group 
label presented as subliminal prime prior to lexical decisions (i.e., whether a presented letter 
string is a word or not a word) facilitated the recognition of typical ingroup attributes as 
words compared to typical outgroup attributes. The results suggest that ingroup traits were 
associated with the superordinate group more than outgroup traits. 
Another interesting technique by Imhoff et al. (2011) used the visual representation of 
the superordinate group as a measure of ingroup projection. A sample of Portuguese and 
German participants decided over hundreds of trials which one of two presented faces 
(randomly generated from one base image) was more European. The average of the faces 
chosen by each sample were then rated by two independent Portuguese and German samples. 
Both groups rated the average face resulting from the Portuguese sample as more typically 
Portuguese, and the face resulting from the German sample as more typically German. In 
other words, both Portuguese and Germans represented Europeans more in their own image. 
Ingroup versus Social Projection 
Ingroup projection has obvious similarities to the older concept of social projection, 
an individual’s tendency to expect others to be similar to self (Allport, 1924; Krueger, 2007). 
While this tendency is likewise constrained by social categorization and applies in particular 
to others who are part of the same category as self (Clement & Krueger, 2002) – similar to 
ingroup projection applying to an inclusive, superordinate category – the reference point or 
anchor is the individual self rather than the ingroup (see also Otten & Wentura, 2001). Thus, 
the question is whether ingroup projection is indeed, as the theory presumes, a group-level 
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phenomenon or whether it is a redundant concept, where the process is due to self-to-
superordinate category projection. Bianchi, Machunsky, Steffens, and Mummendey (2009) 
investigated this question by having participants rate self, ingroup, outgroup and 
superordinate group on a series of attributes (ingroup-typical, outgroup-typical and irrelevant 
attributes), and calculating intraindividual partial correlations between ingroup and 
superordinate ratings (controlling for self), and between self and superordinate ratings 
(controlling for ingroup), as measures of ingroup and social projection, respectively. Ingroup 
projection was greater than social projection for ingroup-typical traits, and the former 
uniquely related to a measure of ingroup bias (Study 1); and ingroup projection but not social 
projection was greater when the ingroup was manipulated to have positive rather than 
negative value. These findings suggest that ingroup projection is distinct from, and not 
reducible to, social projection (for further evidence see Imhoff & Dotsch, 2013; Machunsky 
& Meiser, 2009).  
Cognitive-Heuristic and Identity-Motivated Ingroup Projection 
Theoretically, we understand ingroup projection as a multi-faceted process that can 
have cognitive-heuristic, identity-motivational, politically-strategic or ideological 
dimensions. A number of studies have contributed to the delineation of these different 
meanings (even if some of the researchers set out to privilege one meaning over others). 
Machunsky and Meiser (2009), for example, regard abstract, superordinate categories as 
rather ill-defined, yet individuals are often quite familiar with one particular part of it: their 
ingroup. Therefore, for questions of representation of a superordinate category the ingroup 
constitutes a reasonable heuristic for inference. Illustrating their point, Machunsky and 
Meiser (2014a) argue and found that groups represented as prototypes (rather than exemplars) 
are easier, and hence more likely, to be used to infer the representation of a superordinate 
category, irrespective of whether the perceiver is implicated as a member or not. The authors 
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argue that this cognitive mechanism alone may explain why ingroup projection occurs, as on 
positive attributes ingroups (and on negative attributes outgroups) tend to be represented in 
form of prototypes. However, on top of representation effects the authors also found a main 
effect of group membership (Study 3), suggesting that identity motives conjointly with 
cognitive mechanisms may account for ingroup projection. 
There are further empirical clues that point to identity-motivational underpinnings of 
ingroup projection. As mentioned above, ingroup projection has been found to be positively 
related to ingroup identification only when the evaluation of the superordinate category is 
positive (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003), implying a motivation to maintain a positive social 
identity that ingroup projection may thus help satisfy (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Moreover, 
highly prototypical groups often show stronger identification with superordinate categories 
and stronger correlations between subgroup and superordinate identification than subgroups 
that are less prototypical (Devos, Gavin, & Francisco, 2010). In line with an identity-serving 
function, ingroup projection was further enhanced when an outgroup posed a threat to the 
ingroup (Ullrich et al., 2006).  
Indeed, whether ingroup projection is more of an identity-motivated or merely 
cognitive-heuristic process may depend on how much is at stake for the ingroup’s identity. 
Consistent with this argument, Rosa and Waldzus (2012) observed in status-secure intergroup 
contexts, where the ingroup’s higher status was stable, elevated levels of ingroup projection 
when participants responded under time pressure, cognitive load, or spontaneous responding 
instructions, thus presumably in a heuristic processing mode. In contrast, when the ingroup’s 
status was insecure ingroup projection was more pronounced when there was no time 
pressure or when highly identified participants were instructed to respond thoughtfully (a 
systematic processing mode; see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Machunsky and Meiser (2014b) 
report equivalent results using manipulations of positive versus negative mood to induce 
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heuristic and systematic processing, respectively. Hence, ingroup projection can be both, a 
cognitive heuristic for efficient responding and a socially motivated, deliberate act of 
defending one’s social identity.   
Politically Strategic and Ideological Ingroup Projection 
Not always, however, are group members, even those highly identified and 
committed, concerned with the positive portrayal of their group; sometimes the group’s goals 
require a longer-term perspective than the immediate gratification through a positive identity. 
For example, members may present their group as poor in order to point to an inequity and 
demand redistribution (van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984). Similarly, ingroup projection 
may not always be in the service of a positive evaluation of the ingroup, but may rather be 
used strategically to promote other (longer-term) goals. Sindic and Reicher (2008) advanced 
this position in two studies set in the context of Scottish aspirations for independence from 
the British. They argued that Scots who support independence would seek to bolster their 
case by portraying the Scottish as unprototypical for Britain, thus emphasizing a lack of fit or 
belonging that supports the aim of secession. Indeed, the results showed that, when the issue 
of independence was salient (and only then) support for independence was related to 
perceived relative prototypicality in a curvilinear way, with the latter declining at higher 
levels of support for independence. Further, when support for independence was relatively 
low Scottish identification was positively related to relative prototypicality (ingroup 
projection); however when support for independence was relatively strong Scottish 
identification was negatively related to relative prototypicality. Strotmann (2007) found 
similar results for Catalan and Basque people in Spain, two regional groups with strong 
political aspirations for independence. This shows that ingroup projection is not only a 
function of group identification, but rather depends on the group’s goals and values. Ingroup 
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projection (or the opposite: claimed unprototypciality) can be used strategically to advance 
the group’s goals. 
Moreover, perceptions of relative prototypicality can also be in the service of higher-
order values and ideologies. For example, they could be used by both low and high-status 
groups to justify existing social inequalities (Peker, 2009), for example in line with the 
presumed palliative function of system justification (Jost, Gaucher, & Stern, 2015), or as an 
expression of commitment to values of the superordinate group that provides members with a 
positive social identity (Spears, Jetten & Doosje, 2001). For example, in the context of salient 
economic status differences between African and European Americans in the US, lower-
status African Americans could describe European Americans as more prototypical than 
themselves on attributes such as entrepreneurship, justifying the status differences but, at the 
same time, elevating the attribute to a value of the superordinate group, Americans, that 
might distinguish it positively from other countries, benefitting also African Americans with 
a positive American identity (see Wenzel, 2002). On the other hand, ingroup projection could 
give expression to high-status group members’ members’ endorsement of an ideology that 
justifies group-based hierarchy and their own dominant position in it (Sibley, 2013). In sum, 
ingroup projection can be seen as having cognitive, motivational, strategic and ideological 
underpinnings and functions. 
Perceived Projection by Outgroups 
The ingroup projection process implies that the outgroup is relatively unprototypical 
for a superordinate group that serves as a shared evaluative reference standard; to the extent 
that this is a positive standard, the outgroup is likely to be valued negatively, as deviant or 
inferior. More than that, the outgroup – just by being different, but probably in particular 
when seen as choosing to be different – may be regarded as challenging the representation of 
the superordinate group and what the ingroup perceives to be its defining values. Thus, 
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outgroup members could be accused of engaging in projection on their part, trying to impose 
their values onto the representation of the superordinate category. Such an accusation could 
be made by dominant and dominated groups alike: A dominant majority may regard a 
minority’s stubborn difference and unwillingness to assimilate as subversion, an attempt at 
undermining traditional values. Conversely, a low-power minority may regard a majority’s 
dominance and insensitivity to difference as cultural imperialism, imposing its values on 
everyone else. From either perspective, perceived projection by outgroups could be an 
identity threat that triggers negative reactions (see Figure 1). 
First, this reasoning can account for what may otherwise seem paradoxical effects of 
the endorsement of common identity, observed by Gómez and colleagues (Gómez, Dovidio, 
Huici, Gaertner, & Cuadrado, 2008; Gómez, Dovidio, Gaertner, Fernández, & Vázquez, 
2013). Upon learning that ingroup members categorized ingroup (e.g., Spaniards) and 
outgroup (e.g., Eastern European immigrants) as being part of a common identity (e.g., 
Europeans), participants showed more positive orientations towards the outgroup; this is in 
line with the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) which posits that a 
common, superordinate identity turns an outgroup into a higher-order ingroup to whom 
ingroup-favourable attitudes are extended. However, upon learning that the outgroup 
categorized both groups in the same way as part of a common identity, participants responded 
with less positive orientations. Thus, the outgroup’s endorsement of a common identity did 
not have the same positive effect and indeed backfired. Gómez et al. (2013) showed that this 
backfiring effect was mediated by symbolic threat, measured as the perceived incompatibility 
of the groups’ values. We can understand these results in terms of perceived projection by the 
outgroup: Outgroup members’ statements of belonging to a shared superordinate category 
may be seen as a claim that their group (with its different values) is prototypical of, and 
17 
 
equally fitting into, that group; an attempted subversion of values that the ingroup is likely to 
object to. 
Indeed, measuring such perceptions directly, Von Oettingen (2012; Von Oettingen, 
Mummendey, & Steffens, 2015) found evidence that ingroup and outgroup not only 
objectively diverge in their relative prototypicality perceptions (as in Waldzus et al., 2004; 
Wenzel et al., 2003), but group members also tend to hold subjective perceptions of a 
divergence, believing that the outgroup thinks the ingroup is less relatively prototypical than 
they, the ingroup members, think it is. In the majority-minority contexts studied by Von 
Oettingen, it was in particular the prototypicality of the minority that was subject to such 
meta-perceptive divergences; for example, minority members tended to believe the majority 
considered the minority to be less prototypical than the minority members thought was the 
case. Moreover, there was evidence, above and beyond the effects of ingroup projection, that 
beliefs that the outgroup engaged in projection were predictive of negative intergroup 
attitudes (in particular among majority members, and minority members who maintained a 
separate subgroup identity). Indeed, suspected projection by an outgroup may elicit ingroup 
projection tendencies in response (see also Finley & Wenzel, 2003).  Even when a contest 
over prototypicality is only in group members’ minds, it is no less real in terms of the 
intergroup tensions it can cause. 
Representations of the Superordinate Identity to Curb Ingroup Projection 
It needs to be said that ingroup projection as such is not necessarily problematic. If 
members see their ingroup as highly prototypical they may commit more strongly to the 
relevant superordinate category. Any project trying to promote a superordinate identity for 
the sake of large scale cooperation, such as environmentalism mobilizing the global human 
community, might gain from such processes. However, if humanity, for example, is framed 
as an extension of Western, Christian, economically developed societies, groups that are 
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minorities or just less powerful in the public discourse might feel they are not sufficiently 
represented. Under some circumstances ingroup projection by dominating groups may 
condemn less dominant subgroups to a stigma of deviance, which in turn undermines their 
access to resources and power that prototypical members of the superordinate category are 
entitled to. Thus, ingroup projection may at times be a means to legitimizing injustice and 
dysfunctional inequalities that prevent people from developing their full potential (Weber et 
al., 2002). Moreover, when groups disagree about their prototypicalities, whether or not there 
is an asymmetric status relation involved, the seed is sown for misunderstandings and tension 
which all too easily escalate in outright conflict. In such circumstances it would be desirable 
to curb ingroup projection.  
As ingroup projection implicates the prototype of superordinate categories, the 
theorizing about remedies has focussed above all on how such superordinate categories are 
represented, cognitively and in discourse, and in particular how much scope there is in these 
representations for groups that are different from the mainstream.  Broadly, one could think 
of two options (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel et al., 2007): superordinate categories 
that are only vaguely or minimally defined, thus otherwise undefinable, so that no subgroup 
can claim to represent the prototype better than others; or, superordinate categories that are 
represented as complex so that different subcategories can be equally prototypical at the same 
time.  
Vagueness, Complexity, Coherence and Indispensability 
As an example for the first option, vagueness, consider Bilewicz and Bilewicz’s 
(2012) argument against the recently proposed concept of omniculturalism (Moghaddam, 
2012), which suggests focussing on human commonalities before taking into account 
intercultural differences, as a tool to improve intercultural relations. Such omniculturalism, 
Bilewicz and Bilewicz argue, carries the risk that humanity is characterized by the distinctive 
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features of one’s own culture, which has historically served to justify western colonial 
hegemony. Instead they propose a more undefined notion of humanity, as “[w]ithout a clear 
definition of what makes someone human, people would not deny humanity to outgroups” 
(Bilewicz & Bilewicz, 2012, p. 340).  
Whether a representation of the superordinate category as undefined can reduce 
ingroup projection has been tested experimentally. In a study by Waldzus et al. (2003, Study 
1) German participants rated Europeans on a number of attributes and then received false 
feedback about the results of a number of other surveys allegedly conducted with Germans 
rating Europeans on the same attributes. Half of the participants were shown rather 
consensual results showing rating profiles from the different surveys that were similar to the 
participant’s own ratings (well-defined condition). The other half of the participants were 
shown heterogeneous rating profiles suggesting that there is little consensus among Germans 
about what Europeans are like (undefined condition). As predicted, participants in the 
undefined condition showed less ingroup projection as indicated by reduced relative 
prototypicality of Germans vis-à-vis a relevant outgroup (Poles), which in turn led to more 
positive attitudes towards the outgroup. 
However, the study by Waldzus et al. (2003) also points to limitations of undefined 
representations as a way to reduce ingroup projection: Participants who identified strongly 
with both Germans and Europeans showed relatively high scores of ingroup projection even 
in the undefined representation condition. It is possible that an undefined representation 
appears open to be defined for those with a strong motivation to do so. 
The second option for curbing ingroup projection can be achieved by increasing the 
superordinate category’s complexity (see Figure 2). That way, superordinate categories are 
created that make prototypicality of outgroups not only possible, but rather likely or even 
mandatory. Originally defined as a representation in which “the distribution of representative 
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members on the prototypical dimension is […] multimodal” as compared to “unimodal” 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; p. 167), the more general aspect of complexity is that the 
superordinate category is represented as diverse, allowing different instantiations to be 
prototypical. It carries the notion of a group that would not be what it is without the 
recognition of intra-category differences between similarly representative yet distinct 
positions. A complex superordinate category implies accepting differences within this 
superordinate category as normative, which makes it unlikely that a subgroup that is different 
from the others will be stigmatized because of this difference. Indeed, there is a larger 
tradition of research studying how the appreciation of difference and diversity impacts 
intergroup relations, for instance regarding effects of multiculturalist ideology (Park & Judd, 
2005) or diversity beliefs in organizations (van Dick, van Knippenberg, Hägele, Guillaume, 
& Brodbeck, 2008). 
Testing this experimentally, Waldzus et al. (2003, Study 2) asked German participants 
to describe either the diversity (complexity condition) or unity (control condition) of Europe. 
As predicted, while participants in the control condition indicated that Germans were more 
prototypical for Europe than the Polish outgroup, in the complexity condition participants 
considered Germans and Polish as equally prototypical. Waldzus et al. (2005) replicated this 
finding with Italians and the British as outgroups.  
The induction of complex superordinate category representations may come with a 
downside if it implies an over-inclusive and indistinct superordinate group with which 
members are less inclined to identify – in this case the benefits of a common identity might 
get lost. Peker¸ Crisp and Hogg (2010) found evidence for reduced superordinate 
identification in response to a complexity operationalized as a greater number of descriptive 
attributes and subgroups. Instead, Peker et al. argue that to reduce ingroup projection 
whithout loss of identification the superordinate category should show representational 
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coherence; an organized and orderly representation that makes clear the contributions of 
ingroup and outgroups to the identity of the superordinate group. It should be noted though 
that the authors’ operationalization of coherence, namely as symmetric alignment of the 
different subgroups’ attributes in a table describing the superordinate category, was not 
without complexity (multiple dimensions, multiple subgroups, implied equal prototypicality). 
Still, the findings suggest that, to be effective, complexity should not be chaos but rather a 
meaningful constellation. 
An alternative way of thinking about positive implications of superordinate 
complexity is in terms of the subgroups’ indispensability for the superordinate category. 
Verkuyten and colleagues (e.g., Verkuyten, Martinovic, & Smeekes, 2014) propose the 
concept of indispensability as an alternative to relative prototypicality. Prototypicality 
conventionally implies a graded category structure (see Turner et al., 1987) by which 
minorities would have little chance to be considered equally prototypical, but when thinking 
of a superordinate group as a combination of complementary subgroups (akin to a mosaic) 
even the smallest subgroup (mosaic piece) can be considered necessary and indispensable for 
the overall picture. Complexity can thus be thought of as complementarity of groups toward 
an overall identity. The ensuing perceived indispensability of outgroups has been found to be 
positively related to intergroup attitudes in Mauritius (Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2010), 
positive interethnic feelings in Malaysia (Verkuyten & Kahn, 2012), and support for 
immigrant rights in the Netherlands (Verkuyten et al., 2014). 
Second-Order Conflict about Superordinate Representation 
Two important implications have to be taken into account when inducing such 
complex superordinate categories. First, complex representations of superordinate categories 
do not necessarily reduce an ingroup’s relative prototypicality. Rather, they lead to the 
perception of more equal prototypicality between subgroups. Depending on whether the 
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ingroup started off from a high or low level of relative prototypicality, complexity might 
imply either a decrease or increase in relative ingroup prototypicality, respectively (Waldzus, 
2010). For instance, where a minority group has shared in a consensual notion that it is less 
prototypical than a dominating majority (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2004), the idea of superordinate 
category complexity leads its members to perceive increased relative ingroup prototypicality 
(Alexandre, Waldzus & Wenzel, 2015). Moreover, such a shift towards more equal 
prototypicality between subgroups does not necessarily mean that relations between 
subgroups become more harmonious. Rather, a complex framing of superordinate categories 
may represent a challenge to the status quo that could be seen as threatening by established 
higher-status groups, while it may facilitate cognitive alternatives to the status quo among 
minority groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) that foster dissatisfaction with its inferior position 
and tendencies to seek social change. 
This idea leads to the second implication: Whether or not superordinate categories are 
seen as complex (or, more generally, represented in some form that implies the possibility for 
minority groups to be prototypical) might in itself become a battleground of dispute. 
Established dominating subgroups might reject such representations exactly because they put 
into question the legitimacy of their dominance. Indeed, Strotmann (2007) found that the 
induction of superordinate complexity (by triggering elaboration on the cultural richness and 
diversity in Spain) led Andalusians, a highly prototypical group in Spain, to identify less with 
this superordinate group, essentially withdrawing from a shared common ground. In contrast, 
powerless groups (often minorities) might frame superordinate categories as complex as part 
of their striving for social change (Saguy & Kteily, 2014). For instance, in Strotmann’s 
(2007) research, groups that saw themselves as non-prototypical for Spain and that had strong 
social change ambitions (i.e., Catalans and Basques) perceived Spain to be more complex 
than highly prototypical subgroups did (i.e., Andalusians). Similarly, in an Irish context 
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Joyce, Stevenson and Muldoon (2012) found in interviews that Irish Traveller participants 
proactively displayed and claimed what the authors called ‘hot’ national identity (Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001) in order to establish their Irishness, whereas Irish majority participants tended 
to disparage proactive displays of Irishness and seemed to endorse a ‘banal’ (Billig, 2005) 
Irish identity that represents an assumed and unquestioned backdrop for their own 
unproblematic prototypicality. Thus, whereas minorities may seek to contest, majorities may 
seek to normalize a superordinate identity representation. More generally, the representation 
of superordinate categories as more or less open for minority subgroups’ prototypicality 
depends on its functional role in actual intergroup relations.  
Dominant Groups’ Resistance to Complexity Interventions  
The possibility that dominant groups regard the notion of superordinate identity 
complexity as a threat, questioning their greater prototypicality and status, is particularly 
problematic considering that interventions designed to break down prejudices and increase 
intergroup tolerance are typically aimed at dominant groups. It could be expected that 
members of dominant groups would generally not be very receptive to programs that seek to 
redefine superordinate identity as more complex, particularly if such interventions carry not 
only the abstract idea of diversity but also make salient its implementation in the concrete 
context (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).  
Indeed, majority group members and participants who consider their ingroup 
prototypical of the superordinate group have been shown to report more uneasiness or threat 
after thinking about the diversity rather than unity of the superordinate group (Ehrke & 
Steffens, in press; Steffens, Reese, Ehrke & Jonas, 2015). In one study, U.S. Americans were 
asked to think about the role of the U.S. in North America or in the world (Steffens et al., 
Experiment 3). As expected, U.S. Americans thought they were highly prototypical of North 
Americans, but less so for the world population. They were then asked to think about either 
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diversity or unity (either within North America or within the world). The results indicated 
more reported threat and less positive outgroup attitudes following diversity instructions in 
the North American context than in all other conditions. In other words, in a context in which 
members more (than less) strongly feel their subgroup represents the prototype, they may 
respond negatively to suggestions of superordinate diversity.  
Similarly, there may be levels of diversity that are more (vs. less) taxing for 
subgroups who consider themselves prototypical, with diversity that includes particularly 
counter-prototypical groups likely to provoke more negative responses from a majority 
subgroup. Dieckmann, Steffens, Mummendey, and Methner (2015) investigated this in the 
context of metal music. The participants were death metal music fans, who were a highly 
prototypical group among metal music fans. All of them were asked to think about the 
diversity of metal fans. However half of them were presented with the examples of black 
metal fans and thrash metal fans, which are two other prototypical groups of metal fans; the 
other half were given the examples of white metal fans and industrial metal fans, which are 
peripheral groups that are not regarded as “true” metal fans by some. After thinking about the 
diversity of metal fans and seeing peripheral rather than prototypical groups as examples, 
death metal fans disliked another peripheral group, nu metal fans, more. Further findings 
indicated that too much diversity appears to threaten the groupness of a superordinate group, 
and members of prototypical subgroups react to this threat by becoming more conservative, 
less inclusive, and with negative attitudes towards peripheral groups.  
The same can be true for “natural experiments” in diversity, such as increased 
diversity due to demographic shifts. In the US, for example, there are predictions that in 
coming decades non-Hispanic Whites will lose their numerical majority status and will 
represent less than 50% of the population. Danbold and Huo (2015, Study 1) found for White 
American participants such a perceived demographic shift to be related to prototypicality 
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threat (i.e., the feeling that their status as prototypical Americans was threatened), particularly 
for those respondents who perceived prototypicality to be unevenly distributed (i.e., seeing 
Whites as more prototypical). Moreover, in an experimental Study 2, White American 
participants reacted to such information with prototypicality threat, and mediated by this 
threat, they were less embracing of diversity in the US. In other words, increased diversity 
(whether naturally occurring or as an intervention strategy) can pose a threat to dominant 
groups and lead to the rejection of diversity (complexity) as an identity-defining property (see 
also Craig & Richeson, 2014; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). Hence, while 
complex superordinate identity might be an answer to the challenge of ingroup projection, it 
is not a simple one.  
Consensus versus Complexity: Harmony and Social Change 
As we are struggling with an answer, let us review what the question is (see Figure 3, 
for an overview of the model). Ingroup projection processes imply that members represent 
their own group as relatively more prototypical for a superordinate identity that also includes 
the outgroup; not necessarily more prototypical than the outgroup in absolute terms, but 
relatively more prototypical than the outgroup grants (or is seen to grant) the ingroup to be. 
Indeed, because both sides of a given intergroup context can engage in ingroup projection, 
the groups are likely to show a perspective divergence in their perceptions of superordinate 
prototypicalities (Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). A perceived divergence may be 
all the more likely as members may suspect outgroups of engaging in projection (Von 
Oettingen et al., 2015). The result would be disagreement, either tacit misunderstanding or 
explicit dissent (Kessler & Mummendey, 2009), which causes or reflects negative intergroup 
relations, discord and discrimination. Based on this analysis the question would be how to 
create greater consensus between the groups about their relative prototypicalities. With 
greater consensus we may expect more intergroup harmony. 
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Towards this aim, one could think of approaches meant to overcome an ingroup-
centric view and promote a better understanding of the outgroup’s view. For example, 
Berthold, Leicht, Methner and Gaum (2013) investigated the effects of perspective-taking 
and found that its positive effects on attitudes towards outgroups were mediated by reduced 
perceptions of relative ingroup prototypicality. Hence, perspective-taking may be a means for 
reducing ingroup projection (as well as possibly perceived outgroup projection), thus 
reducing disagreement about prototypicality and increasing intergroup harmony. Likewise, 
superordinate identity complexity could be seen as an approach to facilitate intergroup 
consensus about the superordinate group’s representation and the subgroups’ prototypicalities 
(or indispensabilities), in that it portrays such perceptions as not being zero-sum. With one 
group’s prototypicality not being at the cost of another group’s prototypicality, each group’s 
claims for prototypicality might be more agreeable to the other.  
However, as we have seen, this is in fact not quite true, as members of dominant 
groups tend to resist such notions of complexity (e.g., Steffens et al., 2015). The reason is, 
there is more at stake than mere agreement and harmony; namely equality and respect (see 
Simon, Mommert, & Renger, 2015). Indeed, too much emphasis on consensus and the 
implied harmony may only enshrine social inequalities and foster a misguided contentment 
with the status quo (see Jost et al., 2015). A similar criticism has been raised against the 
contact hypothesis as an approach to improve intergroup relations, namely that its narrow 
focus on the reduction of prejudice and promotion of intergroup harmony helps cement the 
status quo and reduce motivations to seek social change towards greater equality between the 
groups (Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). If the goal is 
social change towards greater equality and justice, intergroup contact (and other approaches) 
would have to aim at greater complexity in the representation of superordinate identities, 
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which affords included subgroups more equal prototypicality as a path to equal respect, status 
and entitlements (Wenzel, 2013).  
Complexity is therefore not necessarily a fluffy agreeable notion, but can be rather 
inconvenient and hard work. However, it is also not an impossible one, as demonstrated in 
research by Ehrke, Berthold and Steffens (2014) who found positive and lasting effects of 
diversity trainings on intergroup attitudes, mediated by the perceived complexity of a 
superordinate identity. Comparable findings were demonstrated in the context of a simulated 
United Nations conference to mitigate climate change, where diversity training increased the 
willingness to engage in collective action (Knab, 2015). Theoretical sophistication likewise 
helps, as demonstrated by Ehrke and Steffens (2015) who devised an approach that led 
autochthonous Germans to feel they themselves were not prototypical Germans in all 
respects; they were subsequently more receptive to a diversity manipulation and in response 
to it showed reduced ingroup bias.  
Moreover, while a more complex superordinate identity representation implies social 
change that tends to be resisted by those who fear to lose their dominance, it might still be a 
more constructive path, for both winners and losers, compared to the alternative: seeking to 
overthrow dominance by converting others to one’s group. For instance, Prislin and Filson 
(2009) found that minority members achieving social change (i.e, acceptance for their 
position) by advocating tolerance for diversity within a superordinate group showed greater 
levels of identification with the group compared to when they managed to convert majority 
members to their position. This was mediated by their perception that future differences 
would be regulated in a more conciliatory manner if the change came about through tolerance 
for different views rather than conversion of others to a new single view. Even majority 
members remained more strongly identified with the superordinate group after having lost 
their majority status, when the minority had advocated for greater tolerance of diversity. 
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Hence, while complexity implies and requires social change, it might also help to build 
common ground for it.      
Above all, however, superordinate identity complexity is more likely to grow from a 
concerted approach, including consistent policy frameworks and institutions, as indicated in 
research by Sibley and Barlow (2009). These authors found that European Australian 
participants implicitly associated the superordinate category Australians more with their 
ingroup, European Australians, than with Indigenous Australians (mirroring US 
American=White findings by Devos & Banaji, 2005). In contrast, European New Zealanders 
associated the superordinate category New Zealanders equally strongly with Maori as with 
European New Zealanders. Importantly, the fact that this result was found on an implicit 
measure rules out the suspicion that answers were just driven by social desirability within an 
ideological climate demanding political correctness. While the quasi-experimental 
comparison with Australia defies clear conclusions, it is plausible that the historical, 
institutional and cultural acknowledgement of Maori in New Zealand (e.g., official 
bilingualism), fosters a more complex representation of New Zealanders – one that makes its 
subgroups more equally prototypical for their shared superordinate identity.  
Coda 
If it is mere consensus we want then the fable of the crows, with which we started this 
chapter, would seem to provide the answer: a rain that turns all crows black – if there were 
such thing. In the human world, cultural homogenization would seem a close equivalent to 
black rain: all would be the same, and there would be nothing more to quarrel about. And, 
yet, as much as their sameness and blackness left the crows grumpy, the human world would 
be considerably bleaker, too.  Colourful diversity is a more difficult project, requiring more 
creative responses as to what joins us all together, and probably a continuous recreation of 
such responses too. One may wonder what would have happened if one crow, to the question 
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what a real crow is like, had answered “colourful”. Perhaps many more crows would have 
joined in, reaching consensus that no single crow colouring is the part that represents the 
whole; instead, the whole diversity of colours is needed to understand what crows are like.   
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Figure 1. Ingroup projection and perceived projection by outgroups. 
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Figure 2. Complex representations of the superordinate group. 
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Figure 3. Schematic map of the ingroup projection model. 
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